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Abstract 
This paper derives testable restrictions on equilibrium prices when capital gains and 
losses are taxed only when realized. We use the Generalized Method of Morr1ents (GMM) 
procedure to estimate and test the restrictions. The empirical results show evidence of 
capital gains tax effects on the pricing of common stock. The restrictions are not rejected 
by the data and estimates of the coefficient of risk aversion and the dividend tax rate are 
precise and economically plausible. Estimates of the capital gains tax rate, however, arc 
often imprecise and economically irnplausible. Further results indicate that this can be 
attributed to the fact that our model does not accomodate differential long and short­
term tax rates. The data appear to favor the martingale hypothesis for after-tax asset 
returns over a before-tax consurnption-bascd asset pricing rnodel. 
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I. Introduction 
The effect of taxes on the equil ibrium pricing of financial assets is an 
important theoretical and empirical issue. In the late 1970' s,  the discussion 
focused primarily on the effect of dividend yield on the equ i l ibrium 
before-tax expected rates of return on common stock (e. g. Brennan [ 1973] , 
Li tzenberger and Ramaswamy [1979, 19821, Black and Scholes [19741 and Miller 
and Scholes [1978, 1982] ) . More recently, however, attention has shifted to 
the importance of the capital gains tax in determining asset values. The 
particular feature of the tax code that makes capital gains taxation 
interesting is the tax-timing option available to investors. Capital gains 
and losses on stock, for example, are not taxed until the investor sells the 
stock. This gives the investor the option to time his asset sales so as to 
minimize the present value of the net tax payments made to the government. In 
particular, the investor has the option to realize losses and defer gains. To 
the extent that these tax t iming options are valuable to investors, they 
should be reflected in equilibrium asset prices. 
Constantinides [1983, 1984] and Constantinides and Scholes [1980] discuss 
the optimal trading of stocks in the presence of personal taxes and explore 
the effect of optimal realization decisions on equilibrium stock prices. 
Constantinides and Ingersol l  [1984] and Litzenberger and Rolfe {1984] extend 
the analysis to the trading and pricing of government bonds. The results of 
these studies indicate that tax-timing options can represent a large fraction 
of the total benefi t s  associated with holding capital assets and, therefore, 
should not be ignored when estimating and testing asset pricing models. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of general 
equilibrium on asset prices when capital gains and losses are taxed only when 
realized. For tractab i l ity, we assume that the long- and short-term tax rates 
are equal .  This assumption l s  consistent with the model of Constantinides 
[19831 and with the current U. S. tax code. As in Hansen and Singleton [1982}, 
we derive restrictions on asset returns assuming the existence of a 
representative consumer.  This allows us to use aggregate consumption as a 
benchmark for pricing after-tax cashflows and thus avoids the difficulties 
associated with identifying portfolios that span the marginal rate of 
substitution. In equilibrium, asset returns depend not only upon the 
covariab i l i ty of the asset' s  pretax rate of return with aggregate consumption, 
but also upon the covariability of the tax payments and rebates on the asset 
with aggregate consumption. The relevant after-tax cashflows for determining 
an asset ' s price at any date are independent of the past history of prices. 
This al lows us to test the asset pricing restrictions without reference to the 
distribution of basis values across investors. 
There have been a number of empirical studies of the traditional 
consumpt ion-based asset pricing model without taxes. 1./hile the traditional 
consumpt ion-based asset pricing model survives tests on equity returns alone, 
it generally fails in joint tests of equity and Treasury bill  returns (e. g. , 
Hansen and Singleton [1982]) or term structure data (e. g. , Dunn and Singleton 
[1986]). Several attempts have been made to improve the f i t  of the model by 
acknowledging measurement errors in the consumption data ( e . g. , Grossman, 
Melino and Shiller [1987]), time non-separabili t ies ( e . g. , Dunn and Singleton 
[ 1986], Fer son and Constantinides ( 1989] and Heaton [ 1989]) or state 
non-separabilities ( e . g . , Epstein and Zin [1990]). The results have been 
mixed. Notice, however, that all attempts to ameliorate the f l t  of the 
traditional consumption-based asset pricing model have focused on problems 
with the way in which consumption or utility are measured. 1./hile we do not 
question the validity and insights of these approaches,  we alter the focus 
somewhat by considering whether returns are properly measured. In particular, 
we acknowledge the fact that taxes alter the returns that assets provide 
2 
investors. Previous studies have examined consumption-based models using 
after-tax measures of return ( e . g .  Grossman and Shiller [19811, Manklw, 
Rotemberg and Summers [1985] and Rotemberg [1984]), but these studies ignore 
the option feature associated with capital gains taxation and assume that all 
capital gains are taxed each period. Not suprisingly, the results of these 
studies are virtually identical to those from studies that completely ignore 
taxes. 
We estimate and test the tax-induced intertemporal restrictions on asset 
returns using Hansen' s [ 1982) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure. 
Using monthly consumption and return data over the period from March 1959 to 
December 1986, the results provide reliable evidence of capital gains tax 
effects on the relative pricing of common stocks and Treasury bills. Al though 
our model ls not rejected and the estimates of the coefficient of risk 
aversion and the dividend tax rate are reasonable, the results fail to provide 
a reliable estimate of the capital gains tax rate. Our empirical results also 
indicate that after-tax returns, unlike their before-tax counterparts, are 
unpredictable and follow a martingale process, 
One possible explanation for the imprecise estimates of the capital gains 
tax rate is that our theoretical model assumes symmetric taxation of long- and 
short-term capital gains and losses, whereas over the time period studied the 
long- and short-term tax rates differed. While a theoretical model that 
allows for asymmetric long- and short-term tax rates is warranted, there are 
well-known difficulties in deriving the optimal tax trading strategies of 
investors for this case. 1 In particular, when the long-term tax rate is less 
than the short-term tax rate, the optimal tax trading strategy may involve the 
sale and repurchase of assets with long-term capital gains to reestablish 
short-term status and restart the option to realize potential future losses 
short term. The difficulty arises in deriving the capital gains level below 
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which it ls optimal to realize long-term capital gains and above which it is 
optimal to defer long-term capital gains. Our empirical results indicate that 
such a model may prove fruitful in fitting the data, but the complications 
involved dictate that we leave this for future research. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I I ,  we derive necessary 
restrictions on equilibrium asset prices given the optimal tax realization 
policy described by Constantlnides [1983]. In Section I I I , we develop the 
empirical tests of the pricing restrictions. In Section IV, we describe our 
data set, discuss our choice of instrumental variables, and present the 
empirical results. Section V summarizes the paper. 
II. The Model 
Consider a multiperiod securities market economy under uncertainty that 
has T+l trading dates indexed by t = O, . . .  , T .  There are J financial assets 
indexed by J = 1, . . .  , J .  The financial assets are i n  positive net supply and 
are characterized by their exogenous stochastic dividend processess {dj ( t ) ;  t 
= 1, . . .  , T}, where dj ( t )  is the random dividend on security j at time t .  We 
assume that the dividend payments are nonnegative and made in units of a 
single consumption good. The ex-dividend price of security j at time t is 
denoted PJ( t )  and ls determined through competitive trading at time t .  We 
assume that all  securities pay a liquidating dividend at date T and, hence, 
P
j
(T)  = 0 for all  J = 1 ,  . . . ,J.  Since the equilibrium only �etermines relative 
prices, the ex-dividend prices of the financial assets are stated in units of 
the single consumption good. There ls a representative consumer with a 
time-additive and state-independent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
given by 
T 
l /3tU ( c ( t )  ) ,
t=O 
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where c(t) represents consumption at date t, ,8 is the personal rate of time 
preference and U (  • ) is differentiable, strictly increasing and concave. We 
denote the derivative of U with respect to c ( t )  as Uc ( t ) .
The tax environment is a simplification o f  the actual U. S. tax code and 
is similar in many respects to the tax environment in Constantinides [1983 ] .  
Dividend income is fully taxable a t  the constant rate o f  Td' where Td e (0
, 1 ) ,
and realized capltal gains and losses are taxable a t  the constant rate of Tc, 
where • e {0,  1 ) .  c To be as general as possible, we leave the relationship 
between 'ct and Tc unspecified. As with the actual tax code, we assume that 
all  unrealized capital gains and losses remain untaxed. This feature of the 
tax code gives investors the option to optimally time the realization of their 
capital gains and losses for tax purposes. No distinction is made between 
long-term and short-term status of capital gains and losses. Throughout the 
analysis, we will ignore the capital loss limit {currently $3, 000 per year) 
imposed by the actual U . S. tax code. 
Constantinides [ 1 983] has shown that under these conditions the optimal 
tax-trading policy is to realize losses as soon as they occur and to defer 
capital gains. This has important implicat ions for the valuation of financial 
assets. In tax-free economies (e. g. , Hansen and Singleton ( 1 982] ) ,  the price 
of a security ls obtained by discounting all future dividends by the marginal 
rate of substitution of the representative consumer. With taxes, however, the 
payoffs on the security will include not only the future after-tax dividends 
but also the future tax rebates on the optimal realization of capital losses. 
This implies that, if a security market equilibrium exists, the price of 
security j must satisfy the fol lowing Eul�r equation: 
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P/ t l Et{ [ m(s, t ) [( 1-Td }dj ( s )
s=t+l 
+ Tcmax (O,  mln[Pj ( t ) ,  . . .  , Pj ( s - 1 ) )  - Pj (s)J] } 
j = 1 , .  . . . J; t 0, . . .  , T-1, 
(1 I 
where m(s, t )  represents the marginal rate of subs t itution between consumption 
at date s and consumption at date t ,  
m ( s ,  t )  
,as-tu ( s )c 
u ( t )  c 
Vs > t .  ( 2 )  
The future tax rebates are represented i n  Equation ( 1 )  a s  a sequence of 
one-period put options, where the exercise price at date s is equal to the 
minimum price reached by the security over the period from date t to date s-1 . 
This minimum price also equals the investor' s tax basis at date s under the 
optimal realizat ion policy. 2 
In equ i l ibrium, the price of the security at date t must make the 
investor indifferent at the margin between time-t conSumption and time-t 
investment.  This requires a price at date t that reflects only the cashflows 
beyond date t ,  including the future tax rebates on capital losses from a newly 
established position in the security. As a result, the equi librium price ls 
independent of the past history of prices. This is in direct contrast to the 
common notion that the distribution of basis values across investors has an 
important effect on the market price of the security. The independence of the 
market price of the security from the basis values of investors ls also 
important from an empirical standpoint since i t  allows the model to be tested 
without knowledge of the basis values of investors. 3 
To gain further insights into the equ i l ibrium price process given by 
Equation ( 1 ) ,  we rewrite i t  in the following convenient form: 
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Pj ( t )
where 
Et{ f m ( s , t ) xj (s, t l} 
s=t+l 
0,. . , T-1, 
xj (s, t )  = 
dj { s ) ( l--rd ) + Tcmax[o. min[PJ ( t ) ,  . . .  , Pj (s-1 ) ]  - Pj ( s )] 
(3) 
( 4 )  
i s  the total after-tax cashflow on security j a t  date s from an investment 
made at date t < s.  According to Equation { 4 ) ,  xj ( s , t ) :s xj (s, t + l )  since 
min[Pj ( t ) ,  . . .  , Pj (s-l ) J :s min[Pj (t+l ) ,  . . .  , Pj (s-1 ) ] .
security j a t  date t ,  t =a, . . . , T-1, must satisfy: 
Therefore, the price of 
P/ t l Et{m ( t+l , t l [xj ( t+l , t )  + Pj (t+l)  - z1 (t+l , t )] }  (5) 
where Pj ( t )  and Pj ( t+l) conform to Equation (3) and zj ( t+l , t )  is a nonnegative 
random variable given by 
zj ( t + l ,  t )  
Et+i{ [ m ( s , t + l l [ xj (s,t+ll - xj (s, tJ] }  
s=t+2 
(6) 
From Equations (4)  and (6), zj{t+1,t)  can be interpreted as the present 
value, at date t+1, of the differential tax rebates on future capital losses 
(beyond date t+1 ) from one share of security j purchased at date t+l compared 
to date t .  Therefore, the differential Pj (t+1 ) - zj ( t+l , t )  appearing in 
Equation (5) can be interpreted as the investor's personal valuation of a 
position in one share of security j at date t+l with basis Pj( t ) .  We denote 
4 this personal valuation by vj ( t+l,t ) .  The value o f  zj ( t+l , t }  i s  increasing 
in the difference between Pj ( t + l )  and Pj { t )  and ls equal to zero only if 
P/t+l l • P/ tl. In this case, the investor optimally realizes the capital 
loss and reestablishes a new position in the security at date t+l .  
Equation (5) can also be written in terms of the rates of return on 
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security J .  Dividing both sides of Equation (5) by Pj ( t ) ,  subtracting one 
from both sides, and rearranging terms gives 
0 Et{m ( t+l , t } (l + r� ( t+l , t ) ( l-Td ) + r� {t+l , t )  - Tcr� ( t+l , t )
- Tcmln[O,  r� (t+l,  t l l) - 1} 
� Et (m(t+1 , t )Rj (t+1 , t )  - 1) 
(71 
where r� (t+l , t )  is the pretax capital gain rate of return on security j from 
date t to date t+1,  r�(t+l , t )  ls the pretax dividend yield on security J from 
date t to date t+l,  and r� {t+1 , t ) = zj (t+l,t )/TcPJ ( t )  ls given by 
r� (t+1 ,  t )  PJ {t+1 ) - vj ( t +l , t )
TcPj { t )  
( 8 )  
Et+l{ [ m ( s , t + t ) (max [o, min [r� (t+l , t ) ,  . . .  , r� (s-1 , t ) ]  - r� (s, tJ] 
s=t+2 
[ 
c c - max 0, min[O, rj ( t+ l , t ) ,  . . .  , rj (s-1 , t ) l  - r� (s,  t lJ J}
where the second line of Equation (8) follows from Equations ( 4 )  and (6) and 
r� (s, t )  denotes the pretax capital gain rate of return on security j from date 
z t to date s.  According to the first line of Equation ( 8 ) ,  Tcrj ( t+l , t )  can be 
interpreted as the differential rate of capital appreciation from date t to 
date t+l  between the market price of security j and the investor' s personal 
valuation (where vj ( t , t )  = Pj ( t ) ) .  As with zj ( t + l , t ) ,  the value of r� (t+l, t )
ls always nonnegative and is equal t o  zero only if r� (t+1 , t }  � 0. 
An important feature of the equilibrium pricing relation (7) is that it 
allows for time-varying risk premla. Using the definition of conditional 
covariance, Equation (7) implies that in equilibrium 
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Et( RJ
(t>l. tl] Rf(t+l,t) (t - covt[m(t+ l , t) , Rj(t+ l ,tlJ ) , (9) 
where Rf{t+t ,t) is one p lus the tax -exempt riskf ree inte rest rate f rom date t 
to date t+t and cov t ( · ,  · ) is the conditiona l cova riance. As in B reeden
' s 
(1979] mode l, risk is measured by t he conditiona l covariance of t he "returns" 
with the ma rginal rate of s ubstitution of consumption . The on ly difference ls 
t hat our measure of " returns" includes the effect of taxes . In· t he absence of 
taxes , R
j
(t+t,t) = 1 + r
j
(t+ l , t ) ,  where r
j
(t+t ,t) ls t he t ota l rate of ret urn 
on security j f rom date t to date t+ l ,  and Equation (9) collapses t o  t he 
familiar pricing re lationship first derived by Rubinstein [1976], 
Et[l + r j
(t+l , tl) Rf(t+l ,t) (t - covt[ m{t+l ,t) , rj(t+l ,tlJ ) . 
III. Testable Restrictions of the Hodel 
(10) 
In t his se cti on, we derive the testable restrictions imp lied by t he 
equi li brium p ricing re lations of the previous section and describe our 
empirica l  met hod ology .  A ccording t o  Equation (7), a se curities ma rket 
equi librium re quires [m(t+l,t)R.(t+l ,t) - 11 
J 
to be ort hogona l to a l  1 the 
e lements in t he investor's information set at date t ,  Yt· T hat ls , 
E ( [m (t +1, t)R
J
(t+ 1, t) - l)yt) = 0, I 11) 
where E[·] denotes t he un condition a l  expectation . The orthogona lity condition 
(11) restricts t he comovements between aggregate consumption and t he "returns" 
on t he J financia l assets . In particula r ,  Equation (11) restri cts t he mean of 
[m(t+l,t)Rj (t+l,t)yt] t o  equa l t he mean of yt f or a l l  j = 1, ... ,J. 
To exp loit t hese restrictions e mpirica l ly, we must either specify t he 
9 
f un ctional f orm of t he investor's uti lity (e . g. ,  Hansen and Singleton (1982, 
1984]) or rest rict m(t+l,t) and Rj
(t+t ,t) to be drawn f rom a parti cular fami ly 
of dist ri butions (e . g. ,  Hansen and Singleton [1983] and Ferson [1983]). We 
take t he f ormer approach and ass ume that the investor possesses a p ower 
uti lity f un ction. That is , 
[ c(t) 1'1 
U(c{t)) 
' 
I 12) 
w here 1 - '1 > 0 is t he coefficient of re lative risk ave rsi on. Under p ower
uti lity , t he ma rgina l rate of s ubstitution m(s ,t) is given by 
m(s ,t) = /3s -t [ c(s}/c(t) ] ., -l (13) 
and, t herefore , Equation (11) be comes 
0 = E ((1=:H c(t+tl/c(t)J'1 -l Rj(t+ l , t) - t)yt)· (14) 
The tests of t he equi librium re lation (14) conducted in this paper re ly on t he 
Gene ra lized Met hod of M oments (GMM) pr ocedure prop osed by Hansen [19821 and 
Hansen and Singleton (1982]. 
p rovided be low . 5 
A brief description of t his p rocedure is 
Let A be an n -vector of un kn own parameters t o  be estimated f rom the 
mode l .  F o r  our mode l ,  n = 4 and A = {/3, a ,  T c' Td}. Define 
ujt+ ls: /3:[c(t+l)/c(t)J
7-1R
j
(t+l, t) - 1 j 1, ... 'J I 15) 
to be t he dist urbances for our e con omet ri c  ana lysis . Equation (14) implies 
t hat E[ujt+lyt] = 0 f or a l l  yt and f or a l l  j 1, . . . , J. Therefore, e le ments 
of t he investor 's infor mation set at date t can be used as inst rumenta l 
variables for t he dist urbance ujt+l· After se lecting m (m > n) instruments t o
JO 
be used ln estimating A, the parameter estimates are chosen by GMH to minimize 
a quadratic form in the sample means of ujt+lYit' 
i = 1 ,  . . .  , m. By choosing 
the parameter estimates in this way, these sample means are made close (in 
terms of the distance measure defined by the quadratic form) to their 
population value of zero under the null hypothesis. However, with more 
orthogonality conditions than parameters to be estimated, the model is 
overldentified and not a l l  orthogonality conditons will be set equal to zero 
in the estimation. Nevertheless, the (m-n) overidentlfying restrictions 
should be close to zero if the model is "correct". Hansen [ 1982] and Hansen 
and Singleton (1982} have shown how a chi square goodness-of-flt statistic can 
be used to test these overidentifying restrictions. 
An advantage of the GMM procedure is that it al lows for the conditional 
variance of the disturbances ujt+l to be an arbitrary function of the elements
of the investor's information set at date t .  This means that the procedure 
al lows for the possibility that conditional variances and covariances of 
returns and consumption vary over time and change sign. Thus, the GMM 
procedure is capable of testing asset pricing models that allow for 
time-varying risk premia. Moreover, it is not necessary to specify how these 
variances and covariances change over time as a function of the investor ' s  
information set. It is also not necessary to make any particular 
distributional assumptions about returns and consumption, unlike the 
log-linear models of asset prices ( e . g . , Hansen and Singleton [1983] and 
Ferson (1983] ) .  
A. The Data 
IV. The Empirical Tests 
Various versions of the model were estimated using monthly data on 
consumption, stock returns and Treasury bill returns, covering the period 
1 1 
March 1959-December 1986. The consumption data were taken from the CITIBASE 
tape. Consumption of nondurables and services was divided by total civilian 
population to obtain estimates of per capita consumption. The stock return 
series were taken from the CRSP monthly returns tape. Returns with and 
without dividends were collected for the 388 NYSE firms with continuous 
records on the CRSP file. These stocks were ranked by their market values as 
of March 1959 and placed into quintiles, with the smallest firms in quintile 1 
and the largest firms in quintile 5. Fama' s Treasury bill file on the CRSP 
bond taPe was the source of the return on a one- and two-month Treasury bil l .  
Where appropriate, returns were deflated using the Consumption Price Index 
implicit in the data on consumption of nondurables and services from CITIBASE. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics (means, medians, standard deviations, 
minima, maxima, and autocorrelation coefficients) on the monthly growth rate 
in real per capita consumption, the monthly real return on an equally weighted 
portfolio of the 388 NYSE stocks, the real return on a one-month Treasury bill 
and the monthly inflation rate. 
B. Choice of Instrumental Variables 
GMM directly estimates and tests moment condi tlons, such as Equation 
( 11), for different instrumental variables, yt . The particular instruments 
chosen should have power to reject the null hypothesis. Asymptotically,  it 
does not matter how many instruments are chosen, but Tauchen [ 1986] has shown 
that there ts a tradeoff between bias and the number of instruments in sma l l  
samples. Consequently, instead of choosing any instrument in the investor ' s  
information set, we limit our attention t o  those instruments that can be shown 
to have power to reject the mode l .  The procedure for choosing instruments ts 
described below. 
We first collected data on instruments that have traditionally been used 
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to test consu mption -based asset pricing models, name ly: the unit vector, 
lagged consu mption growth, ct /ct - 1' and lagged stock (or T -bi l ll returns, 
R
j
(t ,t -1) . The resu lts from estlmatlng and testing the f irst-order cond it ions 
of the representative consumer in a world w ithout taxes wi l l  be used as a 
benchmark. Therefore, we investigate the power of the aforementioned 
instruments to reject Equation ( 1 1) with Rj
(t+l ,t) equa l to one plus the real
return on an equally we ighted portfo l io of the 388 NYSE f ir ms ,  l+rp(t+ l , t), 
and one plus the real return on a one-month T-bi l l ,  l+rf(t+l,t) . Accord ingly , 
the set of traditional instruments that we consider for est imat ing and testing 
the mode 1 are: the unit vector, ct_ 1
1ct' and l+"r p(t,-t-1). The lagged rea l 
return on a one -month Treasury bi l l  is not considered as an instrument. 
To this list of traditional instru ments, we added variables that are 
known to be good pred ictors of future stock returns and/or Treasury bill 
returns . As wi l l  be explained shortly, predictabi lity of future returns is 
the most important determinant of the power of an instrument .  We inc luded as 
add itiona l instruments: one plus the conte mporaneous nomina l return on a 
one -month I -bi l l ,  l+µf(t+ l ,  t ) ,  and one plus the lagged nominal return on a 
two -month I -b i l l  in excess of the lagged nomina l return on a one -month I -b i l l ,  
2 l+µf(t,t- 1 ) -µf(t,t-ll. 
The former shou ld be a part icu lar ly good pred ictor of 
the real return on a one -month I -bi l l  and the latter has been shown to be a 
good predictor of future stock returns by Campbe l l  [1987] . 
As a way of investigating the power of an instrument, we shall determine 
whether it provides some potentia l ly conflicting information in the GMM 
est imator beyond that given by the moment condit ions using the unit vector as 
an instrument ( i . e., yt == 1 for a l l  t ) .  
It w il l  later become c lear what ls 
meant when we write down and co mpare mo ment cond it ions , but, f irst , let us 
,_, simplify them using a linear a pproximation of ct+l about ct ' as in Singleton 
[ 19 89]: 
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,_, ct+l '1!: 
;r -1 a--2 ct + (;r -l)ct (ct+l -
ct) . ( 1 6) 
Using this l inear a pproximation , the mar ginal rate of substitut ion of 
consu mption tomorrow for consumption today becomes: 
m(t+l,t) 
[ ct+ 11 • -l [ ct+!)� --c;- � � + �(r-11 ----c;:- - �Cr-ll . ( 171 
Substituting the above linearizat ion for m(t+ l ,  ll into Equation ( 1 1 )  y ie lds 
the fo l lowing mo ment cond it ion , 
[ ct+! ) (2-r)E [ Rj(t+l ,t)yt] + (;r-l )E �j(t+l,t)yt -1 � E [yt]. 
When us in g  the un it vector as an instrumen t ,  Equation ( 1 8) becomes: 
[ ct+! )(2-r )E [Rj(t+l ,t)] + (r -l)E --c;-Rj(t+ l,t) -1 � . 
( 1 8) 
( 19 ) 
Co mparing Equations ( 18 )  and ( 19 ) ,  it is clear that an instrument wi l l  
not add any restrict ion beyond the one prov ided b y  the unit vector if it is 
uncorre lated w ith both R
j
(t+ l ,  t )  and [ct+l /ct]RJ(t+ t ,t) . Hence , for an
instrument to be powerful ( in the sense of being ab le to add potentia lly 
conflicting informat ion not present in the moment cond it ion with the unit 
vector as the instru ment ) ,  it must be corre lated with e ither variab le . 
other words, an instrument ls powerfu l if either 
or 
cov (R
j
(t+ t , t ) ,  yt) 
[ ct+! )cov --c;-Rj(t+t , t ) ,  Yt 
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( 20al 
( 20bl 
differ substantially from zero in absolute value. Thus, we shall use these 
covariances, scaled by one over the standard deviation of Rj ( t+l , t )  t imes the 
6 standard deviation of yt' as a measure of the power of an instrument .  
Scaling the first covariance by std(R
j(t+ l , t ) )std(yt
) yields the correlation
between Rj ( t+l , tl and Yt· In this respect, an instrument has power if i t  is a 
good predictor of future returns, Rj (t+l , t ) .  
I t  should be emphasized that our procedure to select instruments suffers 
from data mining biases. They are, however, different from the ones 
investigated in Lo and MacKinlay [ 1990 ] .  Instead of using cross-sectional 
information in cross-sectional tests, we use t ime-series information in order 
to generate instruments to be used to test cross-sectional restrictions ( i n  
particular, across stock and Treasury b i l l  returns ) .  The data mining biases 
we introduce are to offset the small sample biases of GMM when instrument s  are 
picked at random. However, the extent to which this procedure mitigates the 
small sample biases remains an open issue. 
Table 2 reports both measures of power for the proposed instruments. It 
l s  clear that t+rp { t , t- 1 )  is not a very powerful instrument since i t  has low 
correlation with both future stock and Treasury b i l l  returns and consumption. 
In contrast ,  ct/ct-l is a powerful instrument because it l s  highly
(negatively) correlated with [ct+l/ct J [ l+rf ( t+ l ,  t ) ]  (see Panel BJ. Thus, 
lagged consumption growth w i l l  be a good instrument for the moment condition 
involving the real return on a one-month Treasury bill .  Likewise, l+µf ( t +l , t ) 
will also be a good instrument for this moment condition since i t  is highly 
correlated with l+r f ( t+ l ,  t l  (see Panel A ) .  The variable
l+µ; ( t , t - 1 ) -µf ( t , t- 1 ) ,  on the other hand� will  be a good instrument for the 
moment cond i t ions involving the real return on the stock portfolio because the 
corresponding measures of power are relatively high (see Panels A and 8). 
This analysis suggests that we should use the following instruments to 
IS 
estimate and test our model; the unit vector, ct /ct-t ' l+µf (t+l,  t )  and 
2 l+µf ( t ,  t-1)-µf (t,  t-1 ) .  In contrast to traditional tests of the 
consumption-based asset pricing model ,  we do not use as instruments the lagged 
real returns on stocks or Treasury bills. 7 
C. Parameter Estimates and Test Results 
We ran three sets of joint tests. The first set of tests involve Euler 
equations for the one-month Treasury bill and an equally weighted portfolio of 
the 388 NYSE stocks. The second set of tests involve Euler equations for the 
one-month Treasury b i l l  and an equally weighted portfolio of the 80 largest 
stocks (quintile 5) ranked by market value as of March 1959. The third set of 
tests involve Euler equations for the one-month Treasury bill  and an equally 
weighted portfolio of the 77 smallest stocks (quintile 1 )  ranked by market 
value as of March 1959. The last two sets of tests are used as a check for 
robustness. 8 
As a benchmark, we tested the first-order condit ions for a 
representative consumer in a tax-free world. In other words, we jointly 
tested the following stochastic Euler equations: 
0 
and 
0 
Et{m ( t+l , t ) [I + j t rj ( t+l , t )) - 1} 
j=I 
Et (m(t+l,t ) [ l  + rf (t+l , t ) ]  - 1) 
where J ls the number of stocks in the stock portfolio, rj (t+l , t )  
return on stock j (j=l, . . . ,J) from date t to date t+l, rf (t+l,  t )
(21) 
(22) 
l s  the real 
ls the real 
return on a one-month Treasury bill  from date t to date t+l, and m(t+l, t )  ls 
the. marginal rate of substitution given by Equation ( 1 3 ) .  This particular 
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version ot the model is the subject of the Hansen and Singleton [1982, 1984] 
studies. 
Four instruments are used to estimate the parameters of the mode l .  
Hence, there are eight orthogonality conditions but only two parameters (S and 
r) to be estimated. This leaves us with six over identifying restrictions 
(degrees ot freedom ) .  The first column of Panels A ,  8 and C o f  Table 3 report 
the estimation results. 9 As in Hansen and Singleton [ 1982, 1984] ,  the model 
is rejected (at the 1 percent level in Panels A and C and at the 2 percent 
level in Panel 8). The estimate of r ls above 1. 0 in Panels A and 8 and below 
1 .  0 in Panel C, al though the standard errors are large. A value of r above 
1 .  0 indicates that the representative consumer is risk loving, while a value 
of r below 1. O indicates that the representative consumer ls risk averse. 
Notice also the high negative correlation between the estimates of � and r in 
all three panels. 
\.le next estimate the Euler equations for the equally weighted stock 
index and the one-month Treasury bill for a representative consumer in a world 
where dividends, interest and capital gains and losses are taxed every month. 
Al though this model ignores the tax timing option available to investors, 1 t 
will provide us with a second useful benchmark against which our model can be 
compared. Dividends and interest are assumed to be taxed at a rate of Td and 
capital gains and losses are assumed to be taxed at a rate of T . c 
Complications arise in a world with taxes, however, since investors are taxed 
on nominal quantities, yet will deflate their after-tax returns to determine 
their optimal consumption plans. Consequently, we calculate tax payments and 
rebates on nominal dividends, interest and capital gains and losses before 
deflating these payoffs. Let n:t denote the consumer price index at date t.
\.le jointly test the following stochastic Euler equations: 
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0 Et{m ( t+ l ,  t )  [n:t/n:t+l l 1 J [ d ] l 1 + µj ( t +1 , t ) (1-Td ) {23) 
J=l 
+ µ� ( t + l ,  t .) ( 1-Tc )) - 1} 
and 
0 Et (m ( t+l , t ) (n:t/nt+l J [ l  + ( 1 -Td )µf ( t+l , t ) ]  - 1) . (24) 
d where µj
( t + l ,  t )  is the nominal dividend yield on stock j from date t to date 
t+l , µ� ( t + l , t )  ls the nominal capital gain or loss on stock j from date t to 
date t+l and µf ( t+ l ,  t )  is the nominal return on the one-month Treasury bill 
from date t to date t + l .  
\.l e  use the same four instruments t o  test Equations (23) and (24) that 
were used to test the no-tax model .  Since there are eight orthogonality 
conditions and four parameters to be estimated (S, r, Td and •c ) ' we are left
with four overidentifying restrictions {degrees of freedom) .  The estimation 
results are reported in the second column of Panels A, 8 and C of Table 3. lO 
The estimates of the risk aversion parameter, r, are now below 1. O in a l l  
three panels {although not significantly sol and have lower standard errors 
than those in the no-tax model .  The estimates of the dividend tax rate, •ct• 
appear reasonable {in the neighborhood of 41-44 percent )  and are significantly 
different from zero. The estimates of the capital gains tax parameter, Tc' 
are significantly different from zero but appear too high (ranging from 72. 9 
percent to 97. 3  percent).  Finally, notice that the high negative correlation 
between � and r in the no-tax model ( see column 1) has now declined somewhat 
and that the correlation between � and Td l s  highly positive. 
Model 2 is not rejected, but in the case of Panel A, and to a lesser 
extent Panels 8 and C, the model can be rejected on economic grounds. When 
capital gains and losses are taxed every period, a capital gains tax rate 
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close to 1.0 (as in Panel A) eliminates nearly the entire return that ls due 
to price appreciation (or depreciation). This reduces both the average equity 
risk premium on an after-tax basis and the variability and predictability of 
the after-tax equity return. The former makes the moment conditions with the 
unit vector as instrument fit better for an estimate of '1 close to 1.0. The 
latter has two effects. First, it makes the other moment conditions involving 
the equity return fit better. Second, it leads to relatively lower weights on 
the moment conditions involving the Treasury bill return, which·is known to be 
more predictable. 
statistic) results. 11 
Overall, a higher goodness-of-fit (i.e.' a lower x2 
We next estimate the Euler equations for the equally weighted stock index 
and the one-month Treasury bill assuming that investors have the option to 
optimally time the realization of their capital gains and losses. The Euler 
equations for the one-month Treasury bill are again given by Equation {24). 
The Euler equations for the equally weighted stock index are given by: 
0 Et{m(t+l, t) [11t/11t+l l 1 J [ d ] l 1 + µj(t+l, t) (1-Td} + µ�(t+l, t) 
J=l 
- Tcµ�(t+l,t) - Tcmln[O, µ�(t+l,t)]) - 1}. 
(25) 
As Equation (25) indicates, in estimating the Euler equations for the stock 
index we assume that capital gains and losses are computed separately for each 
individual stock in the index, as opposed to computing capital gains and 
losses for the index as a whole. This maximizes the value of the investor's 
tax options for essentially the same reason that a portfolio of options ls 
more valuable than an option on a portfolio. Consequently, the after-tax rate 
of return on the index may include tax rebates on capital losses even though 
the before-tax rate of return on the index itself is positive. 
Before the above model can be tested, there ls one more complication that 
19 
must be resolved. Notice that Equation (25) involves the nominal quantity 
z Tcµj{t+l, t), which is the differential rate of capital appreciation between 
the market price of the security and the investor's personal valuation of his 
position in the security with a basis of P
j
(t). This differential return 
captures the value of the higher tax rebates on future capital losses (beyond 
date t+l) that are available to the investor when his basis is Pj(t+l) rather 
than Pj(t). 
z The value of µj(t+l,t) is given by: 
µ�{t+l, t) = (26) 
T 
Et+l{ l m(s,t+l}[nt+l/ns] (max [o, min[µ�(t+l,t), ... ,µ�(s-1,t)) - µ�(s,tl] 
s=t+2 
- max [O, min[O,µ�(t+l, t), . .  ,µ�(s-1, t)J - µ�{s, tl) )}· 
where µ�(s,t} ls the nominal capital gain return on security j from date t to 
date s. If security j suffers a capital loss between dates t and t+l (i.e., 
c z µ
J(t+t, t) :s 0), the value of µj
(t+l, t) = 0 by Equation (26). However, if 
security J experiences a capital gain between dates t and t+t (i.e., µ�(t+t,t) 
> 0), the value of µ�(t+l,t) ls positive and it ls then necessary to know the 
investor's horizon date T to estimate its value. Intuitively, however, as the 
capital gain return between dates t and t+l increases, the value of µ�(t+l,t) 
increases at a decreasing rate. Consequently, µ�(t+t, t) ls an increasing, 
c 12 concave function of µj(t+l,t). 
We first consider a simplified version of the model by assuming that 
returns, inflation and consumption growth are independently and identically 
distributed random variables. In this case, the value of µ�{t+l,t) is solely 
c a function of µJ(t+t,t). We approximate this function by 
µ�(t+l, t) [ 1/2 1 + max[O, µ�(t+l,t)]) - 1. 
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(27) 
Equation (27) captures the essential features of the relationship between 
z c z µj (t+l, t )  and µj (t+l, t ) ,  including concavity and the fact that µj (t+l, t )  "' 0 
whenever µC: (t+l, t )  :s a. 
J We jointly estimate Equations (24) and (25) using 
Equation (27) to approximate z µj (t+ t ,  t ) .  Since there are eight orthogonality
conditions and four parameters to be estimated (�, r. Td and Tc ) ,  we are left 
with four overidentifying restrictions (degrees of freedom) .  The results are 
reported in the third column of Panels A, 8 and C of Table 3. 13 
As is the case with models 1 and 2, the estimates of the risk aversion 
parameter,  r, are not significantly different from 1 . 0. The estimates of the 
dividend tax rate, •ct• are again plausible (in the neighborhood of 36-40 
percent l and are significantly different from zero. The estimates of the 
capital gains tax rate, •c• are lower than those for model 2, but the standard 
errors are large and the estimates are not significantly different from zero. 
Although the model ls rejected (at about the one percent level in Panels A and 
C and at the five percent level in Panel 8), the parameters are tightly 
estimated (with the exception of the capital gains tax rate) and economically 
plausible. Finally, notice that the high correlations are still present 
between some of the parameter estimates. 
We subsequently dropped the assumption that returns, inflation and 
consumption growth are independently and identically distributed random 
variables and estimated our model without the approximation given in Equation 
(27 ) .  Instead, we substituted Equation (26) directly into Equation (25) and 
applied the law of iterated expectations to produce the fol lowing stochastic 
Euler equation for the equity portfolios: 
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0 Et{m(t+l , t ) [nt/nt+l] j J l: ['
j=l 
+ µ� (t+l , t ) (l-T) + µ� (t+l , t ) (28) 
- •c E m ( s , t+l ) [nt+l/nsl (max [O, 
s=t+Z 
[ c c c lmin µj (t+ l , t ) ,  . . .  , µj (s-1,t)] - µj (s, t )  
[ 
c c - max a, min[O, µj (t+l , t ) ,  . . .  , µj (s-1, t ) ]  
•cmin[O, µ� (t+l, t ) J) - 1}. 
- µ� ( s ,  t lJ ] 
These moment conditions, together wl th the ones invol vlng the Treasury bi 11 
(see Equation (24) ) ,  can be estimated directly provided the representative 
consumer' s horizon date T ls fixed. We report the results for T = t+13. 
Since the random variables in Equation (28) now overlap in time, we adjusted 
the GMM weighting matrix accordingly. For instance, setting T = t+l3 creates 
a 12th order moving average process. To adjust the weighting matrix, the 
procedure described in Newey and West [ 1987] was employed. We tried several 
lag lengths in the Newey-West procedure, but it did not alter the results very 
much. Whereas the overlapping variables theoretically generate a moving 
average, very little of it can be picked up in the data. Consequently, we set 
the Newey-West lag length equal to 12. 14 
The results of estimating Equations (24) and (28) are reported in column 
4 of Panels A, 8 and C of Table 3. Since there are four parameters to be 
estimated (�. r. •ct and •c ) from eight orthogonality conditions, we are left 
with four overidentlfying restrictions (degrees of freedom) .  The model is not 
rejected, but some of the parameter estimates are disappointing. 15 The 
estimates of the dividend and capital gains tax parameters are negative in 
some cases, although the standard errors are large. The estimate of the 
dividend tax rate is positive and significant in Panel A, but insignificant in 
Panels 8 and C. The estimate of the capital gains tax rate ls insignificant 
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in a l l  th ree pane l s .  The e stimates o f  the risk aversion pa rame te r, if ,  a re 
be low 1.0 (a l though no t sign if ican tly so) . No tice a lso tha t  the h igh 
co rre lations be tween some of the parame te r estima te s a re s t i l l  presen t.  
The disappo in ting parame ter estima te s for mode l 4 canno t be attribu ted to 
the cho ice of the investor's horizon da te T. 
in T did no t ma terially affec t the resu lts. 
A s  men tioned earlier, a change 
In sea rch of an explana tion, we 
con side re d the po ssibility tha t  the tax env ironmen t we assumed is inco rrec t .  
S pec ifica l ly ,  in contrast to the ac tua l tax code in ex istence over the sample 
pe riod, our mode l doe s  no t distin gu i sh be tween long- and short-term capital 
ga ins and lo sse s .  In rea lity ,  long-term capital ga ins and losses were taxed 
at lower ra te s than short-term capital ga ins and losses over the time pe riod 
covered by our sample . Once the distinc tion be tween long- and short-term 
capita l  ga ins and losses is made , it may be o ptima l for inve stors to rea l ize 
some of the ir sma l le r  long-te rm capital ga ins to re se t the ir tax ba se s and 
re start the option to rea lize po ten tia l  fu ture losses short te rm. In our 
mode l, howeve r,  it  is su boptima l for investors to rea l ize any capital ga in s.  
Perhaps our re pre sen ta t ive agen t is rea lizing too many losses and too few 
ga ins re lative to inve s tors in the rea l  world. 
Unfo rtunately, our mode l become s ana lytica l ly intractable once a 
distinc tion is made be tween the long- and short-term tax ra te s.  The 
dif f ic u l ty arises in so lv ing simu ltaneously for the o ptima l rea l i za t ion 
po licies and the e qu i l ibrium stock price proce ss. In tu itive ly, the dec ision 
to rea l i ze lon g-term capital ga ins in o rde r to reestablish short-term status 
w i l l  de pend upon the size of the ga in and the vo latili ty of the stock. The 
optima l  capital ga in cu toff leve l, however, is diff icu l t  to f in d  ana lytica lly.  
Con stan tinides [ 1984] has so lved for the o ptima l rea l iza tion po licy for a 
world in wh ich annua l stock price changes fo l low an exogenous binomia l process 
and inve stors a re a l lowed to trade on ly once pe r year. W ith the long-term tax 
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ra te e qua l to 40 pe rcen t of the short-te rm tax ra te, Con stan t ln lde s [1984] 
shows tha t  for h igh and medium variance stocks 1 t ls o ptima l to rea lize a l l  
long-term capita l  ga ins each year. W ith trading and stock price change s  
occurring mo re f requen t ly than once pe r yea r (e . g. ,  mon th ly), Dammon and Spatt 
[ 1 990] so lve ana lytica l ly for the optima l long-term rea liza t ion po l icy in the 
pre sence of diffe ren tial long- and short-term tax ra te s.  They f ind tha t  the re 
exists an optima l  cu toff leve l ,  wh ich depends upon the parame te rs of the stock 
price process and the leve l of tran sac tion costs, above wh ich a l l  long-te rm 
capl ta l ga ins a re deferred and be low wh ich a l l  long-term capital ga ins a re 
rea lized. 
In o rde r to de te rmine whether the a bsence of capital ga ins rea l i za tion s 
is the sou rce of the disa ppo inting resu lts reported earlier, we ree stlma ted 
Equa tions (24) and (28) a ssuming tha t  the re pre sentative agen t is forced to 
rea lize a l l  embedded capital ga ins a t  the horizon da te T. We assume tha t  
the se embedded capita l  ga in s  a re taxed a t  40 percen t  of the capital ga ins tax 
ra te, Tc, and discoun t the resu lting taxes using the ma rgina l ra te of 
substitu t ion be tween da te s t and T, m( t, Tl . The resu lts a re repo rted in 
co lumn S of Pane ls A ,  B and C of Table 3. The mode l is not rejec ted and the 
parame ters a re tigh t ly e stima ted. The estima tes of r a re again less than 1.0 
(a l though no t sign if ican t ly so ) and the estima tes of the div idend tax ra te , 
T
d, a re sign if icant and economic a l ly plausible ( in the neighborhood of 38-39 
pe rcen t ) .  The e s t ima te s of the capita l  ga ins tax ra te, �c ' wh ile low ( ranging
f rom 5 . 4  pe rcen t to 8. 7 pe rcen t ) ,  a re now sign if icantly above ze ro. No t ice 
a l so tha t  the h igh co rre lation be tween f3 and Td ls again pre sen t. The se 
resu lts c lea r ly indica te tha t  forcing the repre sen ta tive agen t to rea l ize 
capita l  ga in s  a t  the ho rizon da te T improves the e s t ima tion re su lts.  
We conc lude f rom the se resu lts tha t  tax e s  a re impo rta n t  for de termin ing 
asse t  re tu rns and improve the fl t of the con sumption -ba sed asset pric ing 
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model. In 
before-tax 
intui tive 
consumption 
terms, after-tax 
betas, determine 
consumption betas, as opposed to 
the required rates of return on 
financial assets. After-tax betas should account for changes in the value of 
the option to optimally time the reallzatlon of capital gains and losses. Our 
results further indicate that i t  may be important to al low for differential 
long- and short-term tax rates so that investors find it optimal to realize 
capital gains more frequently. When investors are forced to real i ze capital 
gains and losses every month (see model 2 ) ,  the estimate of the capital gains 
tax rate is too high, and when investors optimally defer their capital gains 
unt i l  the horizon date, and realize only capital losses before the horizon 
date (see model 5 ) ,  the estimate of the capital gains tax rate is too low. 
This suggests that a model in which it is optimal for investors to realize 
some of their smaller long-term capital gains prlor to the horizon date to 
reestablish short-term status may further 
consumption-based asset pricing model. 16
improve the f i t  of the 
One interesting feature of the results in Table 3 ls that the estimates 
of r are not significantly different from 1. O in any of the models.  This 
suggested to us a potentially interesting test: fix r = 1 . 0  and reestimate the 
models to see whether the results are sensitive to this restriction. The 
reason this test is  interesting ls that it  can be informative about the time 
series properties of equity returns. When � = 1, the representative consumer 
is risk neutral and his marginal rate of substitution for consumption between 
dates t and t+l, m { t + 1 ,  t ) ,  is equal to his subjective discount factor, ,B. In 
this case, the stochastic Euler equation for any asset j is: 
Et (,BRj ( t+l , t )  - 1) Et (Rj ( t + l ,  t) - .B-1) 0 (29) 
where Rj ( t+l, t) is the "return" on security j from date t to date t+l.
Equation (29) requires the conditional (and unconditiona l )  expectation of the 
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"return" on security j, Rj(t+l,  t), 
-1 to equal a constant, � . Equation (29) 
also requires the "excess return" -1 on securi ty j, [RJ ( t+ 1 ,  t) - f3 l. to be 
orthogonal to a l l  elements in the investor' s information set at date t .  That 
ls,  
E ( [Rj (t+l , t) - f3-1 J yt) 0. (30) 
Equation (30) restricts the "excess return" on a l l  securit ies to be 
uncorrelated with a l l  elements i n  the investor' s information set. 
To explore these restrictions, we reestimated models 1-5 with r set equal 
to 1. 0.  The results are reported i n  Panels A, B and C of Table 4. The 
tax-free model is rejected at extremely high significance levels. This 
confirms the empirical finding that expected before-tax returns change 
predictably over time. The results for models 2-5, however, suggest a 
different story for the after-tax returns. Notice that the results for models 
2-5 are essentially the same as those reported in Table 3, except that 
rejections occur less frequent l y  in Table 4. The failure to reject some of 
the models suggests that the after-tax returns are not predictable. In other 
words, the evidence suggests that after-tax returns, unlike before-tax 
returns, follow a martingale process. 
As discussed earlier, this martingale result has l i ttle economic content 
in the case of model 2.  Similarly, because model 3 ls rejected in Table 4 ,  
the after-tax returns given by this model do not exhibit the martingale 
property. In models 4 and 5, however, the martingale property has some 
economic content. Both models postpone capital gain realizations 
( indefinitely in model 4 and until the horizon date T in model 5 )  and realize 
a l l  future capital losses as soon as they occur. Consequently, the 
instruments in the GMM estimation are asked to predict capital gains and 
losses, not one month in the future, but several months in the future. While 
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the instruments are good at predicting equity returns one month in the future, 
they fall to predict monthly capital gains and losses beyond one month. Thus, 
the after-tax equity returns in models 4 and 5 appear to be martingales, 
despite the fact that their before-tax counterparts are predictable. The 
failure to reject the martingale hypothes i s  in models 4 and 5 occurs even 
though Treasury bill  returns, both before and after tax, are thought to be 
more predictable than before-tax equity returns. However, our results are 
obtained with a multivariate statistic that tests whether after-tax equity and 
Treasury b i l l  returns are lolntly a martingale. 
We interpret the results of our empirical tests as an indication that the 
data favors an after-tax martingale model over a before-tax consumption-based 
model .  The role of consumption i n  previous tests of the consumption-based 
asset pricing model seems to have been to merely provide noise that dampens 
the predictab i l ity of before-tax returns. This interpretation is supported by 
the higher estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion in the 
before-tax model when restricting attention to the equity returns of small 
firms, which are known to be more predictable than equity returns of large 
firms (see Table 3, model 1).  
V. Smmiary 
In this paper, we tested tax-induced intertemporal restrictions on asset 
returns using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure. The model 
explicitly considers the fact that investors are taxed on capital gains and 
losses only when the asset is sold. We found reliable evidence of capl tal 
gains tax effects on the pricing of common stock. The tax-adjusted asset 
pricing model developed in this paper was not rejected and provided reasonable 
estimates for the risk aversion parameter (consistently in the concave area) 
and the dividend tax rate (consistently in the neighborhood of 35-40 percent ) .  
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Unfortunately, our model was not able to reliably estimate the capital gains 
tax parameter, presumably because our model does not accomodate differential 
long- and short-term tax rates. We were unable to reject the hypothes i s  that 
the representative consumer is risk neutral and that after-tax returns, unlike 
before-tax returns, are a martingale. 
In our model ,  investors optimally defer the recognition of a l l  capital 
gains. Our empirical results, however,  indicate that capital gains 
realizations may be important for determining asset returns. This is not 
surprising in a world where long-term capital gains are taxed at a lower rate 
than short-term capital gains. Occasional long-term capital gains realization 
becomes optimal in order to enjoy higher tax rebates on subsequent short-term 
capital losses. The extension of our model to differential long- and 
short-term tax rates may prove fruitful for estimating the capital gains tax 
rate more precisely. 
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Footnotes 
See, for example, Constantinides [ 19841, Dammen, Dunn and Spatt [ 1989 ) ,  and 
Dammen and Spatt [ 1991 ]  for a discussion of the optimal tax trading strategies 
for the case in which the long- and short-term tax rates are different. 
2 Under the optimal realization policy, the investor sells the asset only 
when he has a loss. Consequently, at date s > t, the investor' s tax basis 
will be min[Pj { t ) ,  . . .  , Pj {s-1 ) ] .  This would seem to require wash sales in
which the investor sells and immediately repurchases the security to 
reestablish his tax basis. However, the price at which a �  buyer ls w i l l ing 
to purchase the security will  reflect the same future after-tax dividends and 
tax rebates as those that the seller would experience in a wash sale. 
Consequently, even if wash sales are prohibited, the price can s t i l l  be 
written as in Equation ( 1 )  provided there exists a competitive market for the 
asset. 
3 Nevertheless, the overall level of basis values in the economy can be 
important in determining aggregate consumption and, therefore, the general 
level of securities prices. 
4 In general, the investor ' s personal valuation of a position in one share of 
security j at date t, t = 0, . . . , T- 1 ,  that was initially established at date k 
� t, vj ( t , k ) ,  can be written as 
vj ( t , k )  Pj { t )  - zj ( t , k )
•,{ [ m ( s , t )xj ( s , k )} 
s=t+t 
{from Equation (3 ) )  
where zj ( t , k )  conforms to Equation ( 6 ) .  Obviously, the higher the capital
gain Pj { t )  - PJ { k ) . the higher is the value of zj ( t , k )  and, therefore, the 
larger i s  the d ifference between the current price of the security, Pj { t } ,  and 
the investor ' s  personal valuation, v
j { t , k ) .  
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5 In estimating the model ,  GQOPT' s Davidson-Fletcher-Powell algorithm was 
used to search for the optimum. The criterion to decide whether an optimum 
was reached was solely based on the length of the gradient. The time 
preference parameter, 0, was transformed to �· = exp { 1 0� )  in the optimization. 
This transformation improved convergence speed markedly. Analytical 
derivatives were used in the calculations of the gradients and the standard 
errors. In add i t ion to improving the convergence over numerical derivatives, 
analytical derivatives often lead to smaller standard errors. 
6 The scaled measures of power are obtained after dividing both Eqs. ( 18 )  and 
( 19 )  by std[Rj ( t +l , t ) Jstd[yt ] .  
This scaling should proxy for the weighting of 
the moment conditions in the GMM estimation by the inverse of the asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix of T1/2 t imes the sample moment cond i t ions. 
7 In an earlier version of this paper, we reported the results of GMM 
estimation using only the tradit ional instruments. Specifically, we used the 
unit vector, the consumption growth rate lagged once and twice, and the real 
return on the stock portfolio lagged once and twice. These instruments 
yielded unacceptably high coefficients of relative risk aversion, 1--.r, in the 
joint estimation of the Euler equations on the stock portfolio and the 
one-month Treasury bill in the absence of taxes. The anomaly disappeared only 
after iterat ing a number of times on the weighting matrix. When estimat ing 
the model with taxes, these instruments yielded implausibly high and imprecise 
estimates of the tax parameters. In the results reported below, high 
coefficients of relative risk aversion disappear after the second i teration 
and the estimates of the tax parameters are reasonable and more precisely 
estimated. 
8 We also ran similar tests for the other three intermediate quintiles of 
stocks, but do not report these results in the paper because they are 
qualitatively similar to those that are reported. 
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9 While qua l i tatively the same, the point estimates in the first column of 
Panel A of Table 3 do differ from the ones found in Hansen and Singleton 
[ 1982, 1984 ] .  The differences are due to: 
i )  Differences in the instuments used to estimate and test the model. 
1 1 )  A longer time series is used in the present paper (extending beyond 
19n1 
i i i )  The CITIBASE and CRSP pre-1978 data have been updated substantially. 
iv) We use a different population measure. Instead of the total 
population, we look only at total civil ian population, which excludes the 
m i l i tary. A great deal of the consumption of m i l i tary personnel comes out of 
the defense budget ,  which is excluded from the consumption series reported by 
CITIBASE. 
v )  We match consumption over a given month by the end-of-month 
population, not by the population at the beginning of the month. The matching 
of consumption and returns, on the other hand, does not differ from that in 
Hansen and S ingleton [ 1 982, 19841 . Consumption over the month of January, for 
example, is matched with the January stock return. 
10 The estimates reported in Table 3 for models 2-5 are sensitive to the 
starting value for (3, the time preference parameter. Two optima emerged: one 
with f3 below 1 . 0  and the other with f3 above 1 . 0. The crl terion function was 
generally lower for the latter. Consequently, only the optima with f3 above 
1 . 0  are reported in Table 3. The results for the optima with f3 below 1 . 0  are 
different in one important respect: 
with high standard error. The 
the dividend tax rate, Td' 
point estimate often turned 
l s  estimated 
out to be 
( insignificantly) negative. The difference in point estimates from those 
reported in Table 3 is to be expected, however, since the estimates of f3 and 
Td are highly positively correlated in all the models.
1 1  Predictably, model 2 was rejected when the tax parameters were fixed a t  Td 
. 50 and Tc 
model 1 .  
. 20. At these tax rates, model 2 differs very l i ttle from 
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12 is proportional to the difference in the value of two put µ� ( t+ 1 ,  t )  
options, one with 
price of P
J
( t ) .  
an exercise price of Pj ( t+ l )  and the other with an exercise 
Since P
j
( t )  = PJ ( t + l ) / ( l+µ� (t+l ) )  is convex in µ� { t+ l )  and z the value 
c µJ (t+l l .
of a put i s  convex in its exercise price, µj { t +l , t ) i s  concave in
13 z We also estimated the model assuming that µj ( t+l , t ) is given by: 
µ� ( t +l , t )  = 0{(1 + max [O, 1/2 µ� { t +l , t ) J) - 1} 
where 0 is parameter to be estimated. The results,  however,  are qualitatively 
indistinguishable from those for model 2, in which capl tal gains and losses 
are taxed every period. The reason these two models provide similar results 
z stems from the fact that the above expression for µj
{ t + l ,  t )  is approximately 
equal to: 
z c µJ ( t+l , t )  = Omax[O,  µJ ( t+ l , t ) ]/2 
when µ� ( t + 1 ,  t l  is small (as is typical with monthly returns ) . The point 
estimate of 0 is close to 2 . 0 ,  which reduces the above expression to: 
z c µj ( t+l , t ) >;;;: max [O,  µJ ( t +l , t ) ] .
z If we then substitute this approximation for µj ( t +l , t )  into the Euler equation 
for the stock index ( i . e. , Equation (25 ) ) ,  we find that i t  col lapses to the 
corresponding Euler equation for model 2 ( i . e. , Equation (23 ) ) .  This explains 
the similarities in the results of the two models when O ls treated as an 
unknown parameter. We also al lowed the exponent appearing in the expression 
for µ� ( t + l ,  t )  to differ from 1/2, but this did not improve the f i t  of the 
model .  
1 4  
We also ran the estimation for T = t+l9 and T = t+Jl, and estimated the 
weighting matrix w ithout Newey-West dampening, but the results were virtually 
unchanged. 
32 
15 
. 20. 
Model 4 was rejected when we fixed the tax parameters at Td : . 50 and Tc 
However, i t  is difficult to interpret this rejection wi thout knowing 
whether these were the true tax rates that the representative consumer faced. 
We concluded that estimating the tax parameters would be more informative. 
16 This conclusion is underscored by the results we obtained when extending 
the horizon date in model 5 beyond 13 months to T = t+19 and T = t+31. While 
s t i l l  signlficantly positive, the estimate of the capital gains tax rate 
decl ined as T increased, suggestlng that capital gains realizations prior to 
date T may produce a more reasonable estimate of the capital gains tax rate. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of selected variables,
3/59 to 12/86. a 
Mean Median St.  Dev. Minimum Maximum Autoc. 
ct+l/ct 1. 00168 1 . 00173 0. 00442 0. 98838 1 .  01704 -0. 235 
r ( t+1,  t )p 0. 00677 0. 00739 0. 04385 -0. 14913 0. 20018 0. 105 
rf ( t+l , t ) 0. 00078 0. 00072 0. 00282 -0. 00751 0. 01080 0. 400 
1lt+1
111'.t 1 .  00412 1. 00370 0. 00310 0. 99520 1 .  01372 0. 534 
a ct+l/ct = growth in real per capita consumption of nondurables and services 
over month t+t;  rp ( t+t , t )  = real return over month t+l on an equal ly weighted 
index of 388 NYSE stocks; rf ( t + l ,  t )  = real return over month t+l on a 
one-month Treasury b i l l ;  and nt+l/11'.t = one plus the inflation rate over month 
t+l .  Since 13 leads were used in the calculation of future tax rebates for 
some of the tax model s  of Table 3, we included only the first 321 observations 
in the computation of the descriptive statistics. 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the power of various instruments,
3/59 to 12/86. a 
y t equal s :  
ct/ct-1
l+r ( t , t - 1 )p 
l+µf{ t + l ,  t )
2 l+µf{ t ,  t-1 )-µf( t ,  t-1 ) 
Yt equals: 
ct/ct-1
l+rp( t , t - 1 )
l+µf { t + t ,  t )
t+µ�{ t ,  t-1 )-µf ( t ,  t-1 ) 
Panel A: 
cov(Rj ( t+l , t ) , yt ) 
Sd{R j ( t + l ,  t )  )sd(y t ) 
Panel B: 
RJ ( t +l , t )  equal s :  
l + r  ( t + l ,  t )p -
0. 019
0.  105
-0. 083 
0. 239 
( ct 1 l cov --'-R . ( t +l , t ) ,  Yt ct 
J 
sd{R j ( t + l ,  t l  )sd{yt ) 
l+r'f( t+ t ,  t )
-0. 040 
0. 014
0. 322 
0. 114
Rj ( t +l , t )  equals: 
l+rp( t + l ,  t ) l+rf( t + t ,  t )
-0. 005 -0. 409 
0. 108 0. 051
-0. 096 0. 121
0. 236 0. 069 
a The entries in the table are measures of the power of various instruments 
to reject the first-order condit ions of the optimal consumpt ion and investment 
decisions of a representative consumer, where the variables yt are candidate 
instruments. An instrument has power if at least one of the entries in the 
corresponding row ls large in absolute value ( see section V.B. for a detailed 
explanation ) .  ct+l/ct = growth i n  real per capita consumption of nondurables 
and services over month t+l;  rp ( t + l ,  t )  = real return over month t+l on an 
equally weighted index of 388 NYSE stocks; rf {t+l, t )  = real return over month 
t+l on a one-month Treasury b i l l ;  µf ( t +l , t )  = nominal return over month t+l on 2 a one-month Treasury b i l l ;  µf { t , t-1 ) = nominal return over month t on a 
two-month Treasury b i l l ;  cov ( • ,  • )  is the covariance and std( • )  is the standard 
deviation. Since 13 leads were used in the calculation of future tax rebates 
for some of the tax models of Table 3, we included only the first 321 
observations in the computation of the power measures. 
Table 3 
Estimation results using return data on indices of commoan stock and a Treasury b i l l  over the period 3/59 - 12/86. 
Panel A: Results for an equally weighted index of 388 NYSE stocks 
and a one-month Treasury b i l l  
Parameter estimates: 
� 
' 
T c 
Td 
Correlationsc: 
�" 
/3, Td 
Tc , Td 
Tc, r 
Goodness-of-flt:  
2 d 
, 
dofe 
0. 998 
(0. 001 ) 
1 . 294 
(0.  466) 
-0.812 
23. 157
(0. 001 ) 
6 
Asset Pricing Modelb 
2 
1 .  001 
(0. 001 ) 
0. 948 
(0. 138) 
0. 973 
(0. 037) 
0. 413
(0.086) 
-0. 757 
0. 856 
0. 143 
-0. 050 
6. 135 
(O. 189) 
4 
3 
1 .  001 
(0. 001 ) 
0 . 985 
(0.  133) 
-0. 124 
(0. 274) 
0. 396 
(0. 075) 
-0. 794 
0. 865
-0. 046 
0. 063 
12. 600 
(0. 013) 
4 
4 
1 .  001 
( 0 . 0 0 1 )  
0 . 881
(0. 135) 
-0 . 612 
(0. 748) 
0.  371 
(0. 137) 
-0. 474 
0. 863 
0 . 060 
0. 184 
6. 834 
(0. 1 45 )  
4 
5 
1. 001 
(0. 00 1 )  
0. 906 
(0. 1 2 1 )  
0. 087 
(0. 023) 
0. 379 
(0. 134) 
-0. 506 
0. 870 
-0.060 
0.  105
7 . 0 1 1  
( 0 .  135) 
4 
Table 3 continued 
Panel 8: Results for an equally weighted index of the 80 largest 
stocks (quintile 5 )  and a one-month Treasury b i l l  
Parameter estimates: 
� 
' 
T c 
Td 
Correlationsc: 
�" 
13, Td 
TC, Td 
Tc. r 
Goodness-of-f it:  
2 d 
, 
dofe 
0. 999 
(0. 002) 
1. 193 
(0. 845) 
-0. 836 
1 5 ,  108 
( 0 . 0 1 9 )  
6 
Asset Pricing Modelb 
2 
1 .  001 
(0. 001 ) 
0. 936 
(0. 222) 
0. 729 
(0. 245) 
o. 427 
(O.  140) 
-0. 667 
0. 837 
0. 310
-o. 118 
2. 981
(0. 561 ) 
4 
3 
1 .  001 
(0. 001 ) 
1 .  007 
(0. 135) 
0. 207 
(0. 318 ) 
0. 362 
(0. 078) 
-0. 776 
0. 861 
-0. 194 
0. 147 
9. 742 
(0. 045) 
4 
4 
1 . 000 
(0. 001 ) 
0. 826 
( 0 . 2 1 6 )  
0. 248 
(0. 677 ) 
o. 151
(0. 154 ) 
-0. 602 
0. 828 
-0. 093 
0. 271 
5 . 879 
(0. 208) 
4 
5 
1 .  001 
(0. 001 ) 
0 , 900 
( 0 .  1 1 9 )  
0. 054 
(0. 026) 
0. 391
(0. 137) 
-0. 486 
0. 872 
0. 433 
-0. 026 
6. 765 
(0. 149) 
4 
Tab le 3 co ntinued 
Pane l C: Res u l ts fo r an equa l ly we ighted index of the 77 sma l le s t  
s to cks (quintile 1 )  and a one -month Treasury b i l l  
Pa rame te r estima tes: 
� 
' 
T 
c 
Td 
Co rre la t lons c:  
' ' 
�" 
' ' 
(3, Td 
TC, Td 
TC,
;r Goodness-of-fit: 
2 d 
, 
do fe 
1 .  058 
(0.051) 
-33. 056 
(25. 315) 
-0. 770 
2 1 .  160 
{0.002) 
6 
Asse t Pric ing Mode lb 
2 3 4 5 
1 .  002 1 .  001 1 . 000 1 .  001 
(0.001 ) (0.001) (0. 001 )  (0. 001 )  
o. 931 0.99 1 0. 819 0.926 
(0.242) (0. 1 4 1 )  ( O .  385) (O.  108) 
0. 841 0 . 076 0.  120 0.079 
(0. 115) (0. 413) ( 1 . 001) (0.019) 
0. 435 o. 375 -0.030 0. 389 
(0. 149) (0.082) (0.213) (0. 125) 
-0. 677 -0. 761 -0. 685 -0. 625 
0. 835 0. 859 0. 771 0. 877 
o. 39 5 -0. 102 0. 371 o. 135 
-0. 123 0. 069 0.  321 o. 1 1 1
3 .  546 13.374 4. 69 6 7. 706 
(0. 471) (0.010) (0. 320) (0. 103) 
• • • • 
a Gene ra l ized Me thod o f  Moments estima t ion and tes ting results fo r the mo ment 
conditions rep resenting va rious mode ls us ing fo ur ins trumenta l va riables ( the 
unit vector, one p lus lagged consump tion growth, one p lus the contempo raneous 
yield on a one -month Treasury b i l l  and one p lus the lagge d  no mina l re turn on a 
two -month Treasury b i l l  in excess o f  the lagge d no mina l re turn on a one -month 
Treasury b i l l ) .  Standa rd erro rs a re in pa rentheses unde r the parameter 
e s tima tes . Probability va lues a re ln pa rentheses unde r the �2 va lues . Since 
13 leads we re use d  in the calcula tion o f  future tax reba tes fo r Models 4 and 
5, we include d only the firs t  321 o bserva tions in the es tima tion o f  the o the r 
mode ls. 
b Mode l 1 is the tax-free cons ump tion-based asset p ricing mode l of Hansen and 
Singleton [ 1982 ] .  The mo ment condit ions a re: 
0 E t{m( t+l , tl (l + � J l: r/ t•1 . t i] - 1} j•l 
and 
O = Et (m{ t+l , t ) [ l + rf( t+l , t ) ]  - 1) . 
whe re J equa ls 388 ( Pane l A ) ,  80 (Pane l 8 ) ,  o r  77 ( Pane l C), rj ( t+ l, t ) ls the 
rea l  re turn on s tock j from da te t to da te t+ l ,  rf( t+ l , t) is the rea l  re turn 
on a one -month Treasury b i l l  from da te t to da te t+l and m ( t+l , t ) ls given by 
Equa tion ( 1 3 ) .  
Mode ls 2 through 5 a re a fter-tax mode ls . The moment conditions fo r the 
Treasury b i l l  a re: 
o = Et (m c t+l , t J (nt/nt+ tJ (t + { 1-i:dlµ f( t+ l , tl l - · 1) .
where trt ls the p rice index a t  time t and µ f( t+
t , t) is the nomina l re turn on a 
one -month Treasury b i l l  from da te t to da te t+ t .  In mode l 2, cap ita l  ga ins 
and losses a re assumed to be taxe d  every month a t  the cap ital ga ins tax ra te , 
i:c. The re fore, the mo ment conditions fo r the s tock indices in mode l 2 a re: 
0 = Et{m{ t+ 1 , t) [trt/nt+l l j t (1 + µ�{t+l , t ) ( l-Td) + µ�(t+l , t} ( l -Tc)) - 1} 
j•l 
whe re µ�(t+l ,  t }
nomina l cap ital 
is the no mina l dividend 
ga in re turn. In mode ls 
month and capl ta l ga ins a re de ferred. 
yie ld on asse t j and µ� (t+l , t )  is the 
3-5, cap ital losses a re rea l ize d  each 
The re fo re, the moment condi t ions fo r 
the stock indices in models 3-5 are: 
O = Et{m ( t+t , t ) [nt/nt+l l J J I: [1 + µ� ( t +l , t ) (l--rd ) + µ� ( t +l , t )
J=l 
- -rcµ� (t+1 , t )  - -rcmln[O, µ� ( t + 1 , t ) J) - 1}. 
z where µj ( t+ 1 ,  t )  � 0 is given by Equation (26 ) .
µ�( t+l , t ) by
In model 3,  we approximate 
z µJ ( t+l , t )
[ 
l 1/2 1 + max [O,  µ� ( t +l , t ) ]  - 1 .  
In models 4 and 5 ,  we estimate µ�(t+l, t )  directly by setting T = t+13 in 
J 
Equation (26 ) .  In model 4 ,  we assume that a l l  unrealized capital gains at the 
horizon date T = t+13 are untaxed, whereas in model 5 we assume that all  
unrealized capital gains at the horizon date T = t+13 are taxed at 40 percent 
of the capital gains tax rate -rc. 
c Correlation between the parameter estimates.
d x2 value of the null hypothesis that the orthogonality conditions for each 
of the model s  are correct. 
e Number of degrees of freedom (equal to the number of orthogonality
conditions minus the number of parameters to be estimated ) .  
Table 4 
Estimation results when the coefficient of relative risk
aversion ls constrained to equal zero (? = l )a 
Panel A: Results for an equally weighted index of 388 NYSE stocks 
Parameter estimates: 
� 
' 
T c 
'ct 
Correlationsc: 
' ' 
/3. "td 
-r c' -rd 
Goodness-of-flt: 
2 d 
, 
dofe 
and a one-month Treasury bill  
Asset Pricing Hodelb 
2 3 4 5 
0. 999 1 .  001 1. 001 1 .  001 1 .  001 
(<0.00 1 )  (<0.00 1 )  ( <0. 00 1 )  (0. 001 ) (0.001 ) 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 .000 1 .  000 
(fixed) (fixed) (fixed) (fixed) (fixed) 
0. 972 -o. 122 -0. 574 0.088 
(0.035) (0.274 ) (O. 760 ) [0.023) 
0. 405 0. 395 0. 4 1 9 0. 4 1 2
(0.076) {0.064 ) (0. 127) (0. 128) 
0. 916 0 . 891 0. 873 0. 882 
0. 127 -0.030 -0.092 -0.010 
4 7 . 316 6.  493 12.255 6. 292 6 . 94 3  
(<0.001 ) (0. 261 ) (0.031 ) (0. 279) (0.225) 
7 5 5 5 5 
Table 4 continued 
Panel B: Results for an equally weighted index of the 80 largest 
stocks {quintile 5) and a one-month Treasury bill  
Parameter estimates: 
� 
, 
T c 
'ct 
Correlationsc : 
' ' 
/3, 't'd 
i:c' i:d 
Goodness-of-fit:  
2 ct 
x 
dofe 
0. 999 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 )  
1 .  000 
( fixed) 
30. 805 
(<0. 001 )  
7 
Asset Pricing Modelb 
2 
1 .  001 
( <0 . 00 1 )  
1 .  000 
(fixed) 
0. 700 
(0.  174) 
0. 403 
(0.076} 
0. 916
0. 199
5. 212
(0. 391) 
5 
3 
1 .  001 
(<0 . 00 1 )  
1 .  000 
(fixed) 
0. 187 
( O .  331 ) 
0. 374 
(0. 065) 
0. 891 
-0. 1 44 
8. 486 
{0. 131)  
5 
4 
1 .  001 
{O. 001 ) 
1 .  000 
(fixed) 
-0.221 
{ 0 . 9 1 8 )  
0 . 344 
(O. 133) 
0.  869 
-0. 337 
4. 515
(0. 478) 
5 
5 
1 .  001 
(0.  001 ) 
1. 000 
{fixed) 
0. 057 
(0. 026) 
0.  422 
(0. 1 3 1 )  
0. 884 
0. 460 
6. 754 
{0. 240) 
5 
Table 4 continued 
Panel C: Results for an equally weighted index of the 77 smallest 
stocks {quintile 1 )  and a one-month Treasury b i l l  
Parameter estimates: 
� 
, 
T c 
'ct 
Correlationsc : 
' 
' 
/3, 't'd 
i:c , i:d 
Goodness-of-fl t :  
2 ct 
, 
dofe 
0. 999 
{<0. 001 ) 
1 .  000 
( fixed) 
52.135 
( <0 . 001 ) 
7 
Asset Pricing Model b 
2 3 4 
1. 001 1 .  001 1 .  001 
{ <0 . 00 1 )  (<0. 001 ) {0. 001 ) 
1 .  000 1 .  000 1 .  000 
(fixed) ( fixed) (fixed) 
0. 824 0. 022 -0. 308 
(0.077) (0. 430 ) ( 1 .  529 ) 
0 . 4 1 2  0. 388 0. 401 
(0. 075) (0.065) (0.  1 2 1 )  
0 . 917 0. 892 0. 874 
0. 232 -0. 107 -0. 124 
6 . 347 1 1 .  742 3. 956 
(0.274) (0. 038) (0. 556) 
5 5 5 
5 
1 .  001 
(0. 001 ) 
1 .  000 
( f ixed) 
0 . 081 
( 0 . 0 1 9 )  
0. 426 
(0. 122) 
0. 784 
0. 199
7. 743 
(0. 1 7 1 )  
5 
a Generalized Method of Moments estimation and test ing results for the moment 
condit ions representing various models using four instrumental variables {the 
unit vector, one plus lagged consumption growth, one plus the contemporaneous 
yield on a one-month Treasury b i l l  and one plus the lagged nominal return on a 
two-month Treasury b i l l  in excess of the lagged nominal return on a one-month 
Treasury b i l l )  when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is constrained 
to equal zero Cr � 1 ) .  Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter 
estimates. Probab i l i ty values are in parentheses under the -x.2 values. Since 
13 leads were used in the calculation of future tax rebates for Models 4 and 
5,  we included only the first 321 observations in the estimation of the other 
models.  
b Model 1 is the tax-free consumption-based asset pricing model of Hansen and 
Singleton ( 1982] with the add i tional constraint that '1 
condi t ions are: 
1 .  The moment 
0 E,{� (1 + t 
j
i
!
rj (t+! , t l] - 1} 
and 
O = Et [a [ l  + rf ( t+l , t ) J  - 1) . 
where J equal s  388 (Panel A ) ,  80 (Panel 8 ) ,  or 77 (Panel C ) ,  rj ( t+l , t ) is the 
real return on stock j from date t to date t+l ,  rf { t +l , t l  is the real return 
on a one-month Treasury b i l l  from date t to date t+l and � is the 
time-preference parameter. 
Models 2 through 5 are after-tax models. When the constaint '1 1 ls 
imposed, the moment cond i tions for the Treasury bill  are: 
0 = Et (� (rrt/ttt+l ] { l  + ( 1-Td )µf (t+l , t ) ]  - 1) , 
where ttt is the price index at time t and µf (t+t , t l  is the nominal return on a 
one-month Treasury bill  from date t to date t+t .  In model 2,  capital gains 
and losses are assumed to be taxed every month at the capital gains tax rate, 
T . Therefore, setting '1 = 1 ,  the moment condi tions for the stock indices in c 
model 2 are: 
0 Et{� [ rrt/rrt + l ] j t ( 1 
J=! 
+ µ�( t +l , t ) (l-Td ) + µ� ( t + t , t ) ( l-Tc )) - t} 
where µ� (t+l ,  t )
nominal capital 
ls the nominal dividend c yield on asset j and µj ( t+ l , t )  is the 
gain return. In models 
month and capital gains are deferred. 
3-5, capital losses are realized each 
Therefore, setting r = 1 ,  the moment 
cond i t ions for the stock indices in models 3-5 are: 
o = Et{�rrrt/rrt+t l j J ( d L 1 + µJ (t+1 , t ) ( l -Td ) + µ� (t+l , t )
J=! 
- TcµJ (t+t . t ) - Tcmin[O,  µ� ( t + l , t ) J) - 1} . 
z where µj( t + l ,  t )  O!: 0 is given by Equation (26 ) .  I n  model 3 ,  we approximate
µj ( t + l ,  t )  by 
z µJ ( t + t ,  t )  ( 1/2 1 + max [O,  µ� ( t+ l ,  t ) ]) - 1 .  
z In models 4 and S, we estimate µj(t+l , t )  directly by setting T = t+13 in 
Equation ( 26 ) .  In model 4, we assume that a l l  unrealized capital gains at the 
horizon date T t+13 are untaxed, whereas in model 5 we assume that a l l  
unrealized capital gains at the horizon date T = t + 1 3  are taxed at 40 percent 
of the capital gains tax rate Tc. 
c Correlation between the parameter estimates.
d -x.2 value of the null hypothesis that the orthogonality condit ions for each 
of the models are correct. 
e Number of degrees of freedom (equal to the number of orthogonality 
conditions minus the number of parameters to be estimated ) .  
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